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In somatic medicine, diagnostic terms often refer to the disease processes that are the causes of patients’
symptoms. The language used in some clinical textbooks and health information resources suggests that
this is also sometimes assumed to be the case with diagnoses in psychiatry. However, this seems to be in
tension with the ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are deﬁned in diagnostic manuals, according to
which they refer solely to clusters of symptoms. This paper explores how theories of reference in the
philosophy of language can help to resolve this tension. After the evaluation of descriptive and causal
theories of reference, I put forward a conceptual framework based on two-dimensional semantics that
allows the causal analysis of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, while taking seriously their descriptive
deﬁnitions in diagnostic manuals. While the framework is presented as a solution to a problem regarding
the semantics of psychiatric diagnoses, it can also accommodate the analysis of diagnostic terms in other
medical disciplines.
 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences1. Introduction
Diagnoses are central to the practice of medicine. In addition to
predictive, therapeutic, and social functions, diagnoses often serve
as causal explanations of patients’ symptoms. The diagnosis of
appendicitis, for example, explains why the patient has abdominal
pain by conveying information about what is causing the abdom-
inal pain. The ways in which psychiatric diagnoses are sometimes
described in clinical texts suggest that some clinicians also consider
them to refer to the causes of symptoms. For example, the Oxford
Handbook of Clinical Specialties states: “Most auditory hallucina-
tions not associated with falling asleep or waking up are caused by
schizophrenia or depression” (Collier, Longmore, & Amarakone,
2013, p.317). Similarly, the following sentence is from NHS
Choices, one of the leading health information websites for the
general public in the United Kingdom: “Depression affects people
in different ways and can cause a wide variety of symptoms” (NHSLtd. This is an open access articleChoices, 2014, Introduction, para. 5). These passages show that
psychiatric diagnoses are often communicated to clinicians and the
public as if they refer to the causes of their symptoms, much like
appendicitis refers to a cause of abdominal pain.
However, this contrasts with how psychiatric diagnoses are
deﬁned. According to the most recent editions of the American
Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM), the dominant classiﬁcation system in
psychiatry, psychiatric diagnoses are deﬁned through their symp-
toms. For example, the current edition, DSM-5, deﬁnes delusional
disorder as follows: “The essential feature of delusional disorder is
the presence of one or more delusions that persist for at least 1
month” (APA, 2013, p.92). Similarly, the deﬁnition of major
depressive disorder includes the following: “The essential feature
of a major depressive episode is a period of at least 2 weeks during
which there is either depressed mood or the loss of interest or
pleasure in nearly all activities” (APA, 2013, p.163).
Hence, there are two kinds of talk going on regarding psychi-
atric diagnoses: diagnoses are used to refer to the causes of
symptoms, yet they are deﬁned descriptively through these
symptoms. From a social perspective, this ambiguity is not entirelyunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 Thagard (1999, pp.118e134) describes four stages of disease understanding: (1)
disease characterisation, which involves the clustering together of a set of associ-
ated symptoms; (2) cause speciﬁcation, which involves the observation of factors
correlated with the disease and postulating them as possible aetiologies; (3)
experimentation, which involves the gathering of evidence to support a causal
hypothesis; (4) elaboration of mechanisms linking the aetiology of the disease to its
manifestations.
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different concepts to fulﬁl different ideological functions in
different contexts. For instance, she observes that “parent” is often
deﬁned as “immediate progenitor”, but used in some contexts to
mean “primary caregiver”. She respectively terms these the
manifest concept and the operative concept, and suggests that the
divergences between the two can help reveal the ideological
function of a term, as well as open up the manifest concept to
normative critique. The divergences between the deﬁnitions and
uses of psychiatric diagnoses, then, might reﬂect the social ex-
pectations for a diagnosis to function both as a label for certain
kinds of behaviour and as a scientiﬁc explanation of certain dis-
tressing symptoms.
However, from an epistemological standpoint, I argue that the
ambiguity regarding diagnostic terms is problematic. First, in the
case of psychiatric diagnoses, the two kinds of talk are in tension. At
least since Hume’s analysis of causation, it has generally been
accepted in philosophy that causes are distinct from their effects.
While it is possible, indeed common, for someone to be both the
immediate progenitor and the primary caregiver of a child, a set of
symptoms cannot be its own cause. Therefore, if psychiatric di-
agnoses refer to clusters of symptoms as suggested by the DSM-5
deﬁnitions, then they cannot refer to the causes of these symp-
toms. Second, although it is certainly the case that terms can ex-
press different things in different contexts, the two kinds of talk
regarding psychiatric diagnoses often occur within the same
context. “Parent” can be taken to mean “immediate progenitor” or
“primary caregiver”, depending on whether one is deﬁning the
term in a biological context or whether one is a teacher writing
parents’ evening invitations, but the same psychiatrist who uses a
diagnosis to pick out a set of symptoms may also invoke it as a
causal explanation of the symptoms within the same clinical
encounter.
This does not only present an epistemological problem, but one
that has inspired criticism of psychiatric practice. Szasz, a major
proponent of the 1960s antipsychiatry movement, criticised the
way in which mental illness is reiﬁed as a cause of certain types of
behaviour when it is only supposed to be a shorthand label for
these types of behaviour (Szasz, 1961, p.15). There are also impli-
cations at the level of everyday doctorepatient communication.
Given the historical and cultural underpinnings of psychiatry as a
scientiﬁc discipline, there is an expectation for its diagnostic terms
to pick out actual disease processes in theworld that help to explain
symptoms, as evidenced by the language used in clinical texts.
However, if psychiatric diagnoses merely refer to sets of symptoms
as suggested by the DSM-5 deﬁnitions, then offering these di-
agnoses as explanations of the symptoms amounts to a tautology.
This raises the ethical worry that patients are misled into believing
that their symptoms are being explained by their diagnoses, when
they are merely being labelled.
This paper explores how theories of reference in the philos-
ophy of language can help to clarify the semantics of diagnostic
terms in psychiatry. My aim is to present a conceptual frame-
work that resolves the epistemological tension between their
uses and deﬁnitions. This is not intended to be a normative ac-
count of what psychiatric practice should be like, but rather a
description of the semantic practices of psychiatrists that ac-
commodates the actuality of diagnostic terms being used in two
seemingly contradictory ways. I begin by considering the tradi-
tional view that some diagnostic terms describe symptoms while
others refer to causes, and that the development of a diagnostic
term involves a progressive change in its conception from the
former to the latter. I discuss the worry that this change implies
incommensurability between older and newer conceptions of a
diagnostic term. I then look at the causal theory of reference as amore reasonable account of diagnostic terms that avoids the
implication of semantic incommensurability. Despite its advan-
tages, I argue that something more than a pure causal theory of
reference is required for an adequate analysis of psychiatric di-
agnoses. I put forward a solution based on the conceptual
framework of two-dimensional semantics, which allows diag-
nostic terms to refer to the causes of symptoms despite being
deﬁned through their symptoms.
2. Descriptive and causal conceptions of diagnostic terms
2.1. Ontological descriptivism
In her paper, “Is This Dame Melancholy?” (2003), Radden con-
trasts descriptive and causal approaches to deﬁning disorders. The
descriptive approach provides deﬁnitions of disorders that consist
of descriptions of symptoms, without mention of the processes that
cause these symptoms. Radden observes that this is the approach
used by the most recent editions of DSM to deﬁne psychiatric
disorders. Descriptive deﬁnitions also sometimes feature in other
medical disciplines. The deﬁnition of “chronic bronchitis”, for
example, includes “cough and sputum expectoration on most days
for at least threemonths of the year and for at least two consecutive
years” (Braman, 2006, p.104).
Radden relates the descriptive approach to a view she calls
ontological descriptivism, which suggests that diagnostic terms
refer exclusively to clusters of symptoms. According to this view,
“major depressive disorder” refers solely to the conjunction of the
patient’s low mood, loss of interest, and other associated symp-
toms. This is not to say that this conjunction of symptoms does not
have a cause, but merely that the diagnosis of major depressive
disorder does not refer to any causes. According to this analysis,
clinical texts are wrong when they cite psychiatric diagnoses as
referring to the causes of certain symptoms. Rather, they refer to
the symptoms themselves.
In contrast to descriptivism, a causal conception of diagnostic
terms states that a diagnosis does not refer to the conjunction of
symptoms, but to its cause. For example, “appendicitis” does not
refer to abdominal pain and associated symptoms. Rather, it refers
to the cause of these symptoms, namely inﬂammation of the
appendix.
2.2. Conceptual change
It has been suggested that the historical development of a
diagnostic term involves a progressive change from descriptive
to causal conceptions. Hempel (1965) and Thagard (1999) pro-
pose that a scientiﬁc discipline proceeds from an early obser-
vational stage, when the aim is to describe the phenomena
being studied, to later theoretical stages, when the aim is to
explain the phenomena with appeal to theories.1 Accordingly,
Hempel predicted that the classiﬁcation of psychiatric disorders
will follow this trend from descriptive to progressively more
theoretical language.
It is also worth noting that diagnostic terms can undergo other
sorts of conceptual change in addition to the sort proposed by
Hempel and Thagard. For example, there may be a change in the
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criteria for schizophrenia were modiﬁed between the publications
of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) to DSM-5 (APA, 2013). There may be a
change from one causal conception to another, such as when
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease went from being considered a disease
caused by slow viruses to a disease caused by prions.
The image of disease understanding proposed so far suggests
that diagnostic terms undergo conceptual changes throughout
their histories. According to Hempel and Thagard, a diagnostic term
normally begins as a descriptive concept that refers to a set of
associated symptoms. As the aetiology andmechanisms underlying
these symptoms are discovered, it becomes a concept that refers to
what normally causes these symptoms. This suggests that psychi-
atric diagnoses do not currently refer to the causes of their symp-
toms, but that there is hope that they will in the future, as our
disease understanding increases.2.3. Semantic incommensurability
The move from descriptive to causal conceptions of diseases is
generally considered to be positive, as it allows greater explanatory
power, more accurate prediction, improved prevention, and the
development of targeted treatments. However, this conceptual
change further complicates the question of what states of affair
diagnostic terms refer to. It seems to suggest that a diagnostic term
can refer to a conjunction of symptoms at one time and refer to
what causes these symptoms at a later time.
There is disagreement among philosophers over whether this is
rational conceptual change or whether it amounts to amore serious
problem of semantic incommensurability. Thagard (1999) ac-
knowledges that conceptual change does occur with changes in
disease understanding, but presents this as being largely unprob-
lematic. However, there are philosophers who propose that this
kind of conceptual change implies radical incommensurability be-
tween the old and new concepts. Notably, Kuhn (1962, 2000) and
Feyerabend (1962) insist that the gap of meaning between old and
new conceptions of a term amounts to linguistic instability, thus
precluding meaningful comparison between the term’s uses before
and after the conceptual change.
The worry about semantic incommensurability regarding diag-
nostic terms goes at least as far back as Fleck’s Genesis and Devel-
opment of a Scientiﬁc Fact (1981 [1935]). Using the example of
syphilis, Fleck argues that new concepts of a disease are not
adequate substitutes for the old concepts. Throughout its history,
“syphilis” had been deﬁned as a disease that is treated by mercury,
a set of characteristic symptoms, and then ﬁnally as Treponema
pallidum infection. These different concepts have different exten-
sions, and so cannot be equated. For example, “a disease that is
treated by mercury” excludes treatment-resistant cases of
T. pallidum infection and “a set of characteristic symptoms” ex-
cludes asymptomatic cases.
Radden (2003) reaches a similar formulation in her cross-
historical comparison of pre-nineteenth century melancholia and
today’s depression. Here, the comparison is between two descrip-
tive conceptions of what is often assumed to be the same disorder:
“melancholia” and “depression” are often thought to refer to the
same thing. However, Radden argues that they cannot be equated.
First, there are differences between the symptom proﬁles of
melancholia and depression, which suggests that the two are not
coextensive. For instance, Radden observes that some cases of
modern-day schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder
would also qualify as cases of melancholia. Second, if the descrip-
tivism of the DSM is assumed and “depression” refers exclusively to
a set of symptoms, then depression and melancholia cannot beequated on causal grounds, because causal factors are not part of
the meaning of “depression”.
Semantic incommensurability challenges the intuition that
there is continuity between the past and present concepts of a
disease. As previously noted, “syphilis” had been deﬁned as a set of
characteristic symptoms before it was later deﬁned as T. pallidum
infection. If, after the discovery of T. pallidum, it turns out that some
of the previous cases diagnosed as syphilis on the basis of their
symptoms were not caused by T. pallidum, then there is an intuition
that such cases were false positives and that it turned out that they
were not actually cases of syphilis. We might say that the doctors
who identiﬁed such cases as syphilis turned out to be wrong.
However, the incommensurability problem suggests that we could
not claim that they were wrong, because they were using a
different meaning of “syphilis”. With respect to their meaning of
“syphilis”, they were right.
This is untenable, because it seems to suggest that discoveries in
medical science do not actually increase our understanding of in-
dividual diseases. LaPorte (2004, p.114) notes that what appears to
be an increase in understanding of a term is actually a case of
changing its meaning, so that it refers to a different state of affairs.
Before the discovery of T. pallidum, “syphilis” used to refer to a set of
characteristic symptoms. After the discovery of T. pallidum, it
referred toT. pallidum infection. Let us call these concepts SYPHILIS-
1 and SYPHILIS-2, respectively. Rather than resulting in an increase
in the understanding of SYPHILIS-1, the discovery of T. pallidum
resulted in “syphilis” being displaced from SYPHILIS-1 and attached
instead onto SYPHILIS-2. Similarly, Sankey (2009, p.198) notes that
if a later concept does not refer to the same phenomenon to which
an earlier concept had referred, then the conceptual change does
not constitute an increase in knowledge about the phenomenon
referred to by the earlier concept.
The implication of incommensurability not only makes cross-
historical comparisons of disorders problematic, but also cross-
cultural comparisons. As noted by Radden (2003, p.44), it is often
reported that people with depression in China present with
different symptoms from people with depression in the West. In
particular, Chinese depression is said to present predominantly
with somatic symptoms such as back pain and headache, rather
than mood symptoms. Radden even notes that in some cases, there
is no apparent commonality between the symptoms of Chinese and
Western depression. Again, she argues that if descriptivism is
assumed and “depression” is deﬁned exclusively through its
symptoms, then Chinese and Western depression cannot be
equated because of this lack of commonality between their
symptom proﬁles.
3. The causal theory of reference
3.1. A solution to incommensurability
In contemporary discussions (LaPorte, 2004; Sankey, 2009),
semantic incommensurability is normally presented as being a
problem for analyses of conceptual change that presume the
descriptive theory of reference. The descriptive theory, as advo-
cated by Frege (1952 [1892]) and Russell (1905), states that the
sense, or intension, of a term consists of a description. The refer-
ence, or extension, of the term is what satisﬁes this description.
However, as disease understanding changes, so does the descrip-
tion associated with a diagnostic term. Under the descriptive the-
ory, this change in description amounts to a change in reference, as
is suggested by the above case of syphilis where the old and new
descriptions are not coextensive.
The problem of semantic incommensurability has attracted
different responses. One such response suggests that the
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down the theory dependence of terms. Bird (2004) and
Dragulinescu (2011) make the distinction between thick and thin
intensionalism. According to thick intensionalism, the theory
dependence of a term’s intension is very broad, such that many
theoretical assumptions are included in it. According to thin
intensionalism, the term’s intension is much narrower, such that
only some theoretical assumptions are included in it. They then
suggest that the latter is not signiﬁcantly affected by incommen-
surability, because narrow descriptions confer enough stability of
meaning across changes in theory. However, while this may ac-
count for comparisons of terms across changes in the underlying
theories, it is less clear whether it can account for such cases as
Radden’s cross-cultural comparison of Chinese and Western
depression, where there are signiﬁcant differences between de-
scriptions that are exclusively symptom-based.
Another response to semantic incommensurability, and
perhaps the most inﬂuential, appeals to Putnam (1975) and
Kripke’s (1980) causal theory of reference. This altogether denies
that reference is determined by a description, instead proposing
that it is determined by the nature of the phenomenon being
investigated and its causal relation with the speaker. Kripke de-
scribes the processes of reference ﬁxing and borrowing. Reference
ﬁxing involves the initial ostensive dubbing of a paradigmatic
sample of the phenomenon by a speaker or group of speakers,
such as the disease associated with neurodegeneration and pro-
gressive dementia being dubbed “Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease” in the
1920s. Reference borrowing involves the transmission of the
dubbed term between speakers in the linguistic community via
communicative exchanges.
Because reference determination depends on the nature of the
phenomenon being investigated and not on the speaker’s
description associated with a term, the causal theory of reference
offers a promising way around the problem of incommensurability.
The description associated with “syphilis” has changed over the
years, but the term’s reference has not changed, because it is ﬁxed
by the initial ostensive dubbing of the sample. Changes in disease
understanding do not result in changes in the term’s meaning, but
in better knowledge of the same disease and of what correctly
belongs in the extensions of the term.
3.2. Disease kind essentialism
According to the causal theory, a term’s extension is not deter-
mined by a description, but by the nature of the phenomenon in the
external world. It is often argued that this implies a sort of essen-
tialism, whereby a member of a kind has an essence that is
necessary for its identity as a member of the kind (Haukioja, 2015;
Putnam, 1975). A distinction is often made between intrinsic and
relational essentialism. Intrinsic essentialism states that kind
membership is determined by an intrinsic property of the phe-
nomenon, such as its microstructure. For instance, the essence of
water is its microstructure H2O, such that something must be H2O
for it to be water. By contrast, relational essentialism states that
kind membership is determined by a certain relation between the
phenomenon and other phenomena, such as its causal history. For
example, some philosophers argue that an organism’s membership
of a biological species depends on its phylogenetic lineage (LaPorte,
2004; Millikan, 1999).
Putnam (1975) assumes essentialism about disease kinds and,
in doing so, supports a robustly causal conception of diagnostic
terms. His position is expounded in detail by Williams (2011a).
According to Williams, Putnam proposes that a disease has a
relational essence, namely its cause. For example, the essence of
polio is poliovirus infection, such that all and only instances ofillnesses that involve poliovirus infection are cases of polio. A
case of an illness that resembles polio in its symptom proﬁle but
which is not caused by poliovirus infection would not be a case
of polio (Putnam, 1975, p.329). Conversely, an instance of
poliovirus infection with atypical symptoms would still be a case
of polio.
Note that one does not require prior knowledge of the nature of
the cause of a disease to support essentialism. The cause is
discovered a posteriori, but this does not change the reference of the
diagnostic term, which is ﬁxed by the dubbing of the paradigmatic
sample. Even before the discovery of poliovirus, one could still
consider the essence of polio to be its hidden causal structure and
postulate that all cases of polio share the same kind of causal
structure. The subsequent discovery of poliovirus elucidates the
nature of this causal structure, and allows speakers to establish
which cases have correctly and incorrectly been identiﬁed as cases
of polio.
Williams also offers an analysis of Putnam’s view on the causal
relations between diseases and symptoms. First, Williams notes
that Putnam rejects the descriptivist claim that a disease refers to a
cluster of symptoms. For instance, Putnam states that “multiple
sclerosis” does not mean “the simultaneous presence of such and
such symptoms”, but “that disease which is normally responsible
for some or all of the following symptoms.” (Putnam,1975, p.329).
Second, as noted above, Putnam claims that the essence of a disease
is its cause, such as poliovirus being the essence of polio. Given that
it is generally accepted in philosophy that causes are distinct from
their effects, this suggests that although poliovirus is essential for
something to count as a case of polio, it is nonetheless distinct from
the disease state of polio itself.
This disease kind essentialism, then, assumes a causal chain
with three components: “the cause of the disease, the disease
itself, and the symptoms of the disease (which are caused by the
disease)” (Williams, 2011a, p.167). For example, poliovirus causes
polio, which in turn causes infantile paralysis. According to
Williams’ reading of Putnam, the cause of the disease is a rela-
tional essence that is distinct from the disease itself. This sug-
gests that a disease term refers neither to the cause of the
disease nor to the symptoms of the disease, but to an interme-
diate link in the causal chain: “polio” refers to the disease which
is caused by poliovirus and which causes the symptoms of in-
fantile paralysis.
The distinctions between the three steps in this causal chain can
be interpreted as parallelling the distinctions between aetiology,
pathology, and clinical features that are assumed in clinical text-
books: clinical features are the symptoms and signs with which the
patient typically presents; pathology refers to the internal disease
process that causes the clinical features; and aetiology refers to the
more remote causal factors which are responsible for the pathol-
ogy. For example, the entry on polio in Rendle-Short and Gray
(1967, pp.386e387) states that the aetiology is the infectious or-
ganism poliovirus, the pathology is central nervous system
destruction and muscle atrophy, and the clinical features include
fever, malaise, and paralysis.
And so, an attraction of the three-step model is that it accom-
modates different kinds of causal explanatory talk in medicine. As
noted above, the cause of the disease, the disease itself, and the
symptoms of the disease are considered distinct nodes in a causal
chain. This allows diseases to enter into causal explanations of
symptoms, such as a case of infantile paralysis being explained by
the diagnosis of polio and a case of paresis being explained by the
diagnosis of syphilis. Moreover, it accounts for the way in which
more general explanations of the diseases themselves appeal to
their aetiologies, such as the disease polio being explained by
poliovirus.
Fig. 1. Causal network for myocardial infarction.
2 Although Williams’ suggestion that some diagnostic terms are determined by
HPCs rather than simple essences is plausible, I argue that such a move may not be
necessary in his given example of RA. While not completely understood, the
pathophysiology of RA is tidier than Williams acknowledges, being characterised by
the autoimmune reaction to autoantigens expressed in the joints (Boissier,
Semerano, Challal, Saidenberg-Kermanac’h, & Falgarone, 2012). Therefore, the
essentialist could justiﬁably claim that the essence of RA is the autoimmune
damage to the joints.
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Although it has its merits, the analysis of disease terms pre-
sented here seems overly simplistic. As observed by Williams
(2011a), the three-step model complements the germ theory of
disease, according to which diseases are caused by pathogens and
are classiﬁed on the basis of pathogen species. While this remains
relevant for such infectious diseases as polio and syphilis, it is un-
suitable for diseases that do not have speciﬁc singular causes but
result from multiple contributing factors. Hence, the three-step
model as it stands does not offer the most charitable rendering of
the causal theory as applied to diagnostic terms. I now consider two
modiﬁcations that help to address this.
The ﬁrst modiﬁcation involves relaxing the restrictions on the
kinds of property that can constitute a disease essence. Putnam
suggests that diseases have relational essences, namely their
aetiological agents. However, as noted above many diseases do not
have speciﬁc singular causes, and so are not classiﬁed on the basis
of aetiological agent, but instead on the basis of pathophysiology. In
some cases, this can be resolved by replacing relational essen-
tialismwith a kind of intrinsic essentialism, such that the essence of
the disease is its pathophysiology. For example, the essence of
appendicitis is inﬂammation of the appendix and the essence of
bronchial carcinoma is uncontrolled cell growth in lung tissue.
However, this may not be quite enough in other cases where the
pathophysiologies are more complex. Williams (2011b) cites
rheumatoid arthritis (RA) as an example. He refers to the American
Rheumatism Association’s 1988 diagnostic criteria for RA, accord-
ing to which the diagnosis is made if a patient displays at least four
of seven anatomical, pathological, and radiological features. Each
individual criterion is neither sufﬁcient nor necessary for a diag-
nosis of RA. Moreover, different cases of RA may fulﬁl different
combinations of criteria.
Williams concludes that RA does not have a simple essence.
Rather, using a notion coined by Boyd (1999), he proposes that RA is
best conceived as a homeostatic property cluster (HPC). According
to this view, members of a given kind do not have to share a single
necessary property, but can share clusters of similarities that are
causally connected. For example, Boyd suggests that biological
species are HPCs. Members of a species share a number of common
properties, but there is signiﬁcant variation within the species that
no single property is essential for membership within that species.Similarly, Williams proposes that there is a cluster of properties
that can be satisﬁed to varying degrees for something to be a case of
RA, but it is neither sufﬁcient nor necessary for any particular one of
these properties to be satisﬁed. This potentially allows for more
variability between the members of a kind, as different combina-
tions of the properties may be satisﬁed for kind membership.2
The second modiﬁcation involves expanding the three-step
causal chain into a more complex causal network. As noted by
Thagard (1999), disease causation is usually a complex process with
multiple interplaying factors. Not only can there be numerous risk
and protective factors that inﬂuence the development of the dis-
ease, but the disease itself can be a causal factor that inﬂuences the
development of other diseases. This suggests that disease causation
cannot be adequately modelled by a simple linear chain. Rather, a
more complex causal network is needed to acknowledge the
multifactorial aetiologies of some diseases.
Fig. 1 shows an example of a causal network for myocardial
infarction. This network acknowledges multiple aetiological fac-
tors, including other diseases that contribute to the development of
myocardial infarction. It also includes other diseases caused by
myocardial infarction.
Due to the acknowledgement of multiple factors involved in
disease causation, the causal network model is overall more satis-
fying than the three-stepmodel. Again, this is fully compatible with
the causal theory of reference and a causal conception of diagnostic
terms: “myocardial infarction” refers to the pathology that causes a
patient’s clinical features. However, rather than just being the in-
termediate link in a linear causal chain, the model acknowledges
that myocardial infarction is nested within a broader causal
network and has complex causal connections with other diseases.
According to Thagard (1999, p.114), the causal relations in such a
network are intended to map onto the actual causal relations in
individual cases of the disease. However, not every feature of the
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states that the causal relations in the model are not deterministic,
but statistically-based. Hence, different instances of myocardial
infarction may result from different combinations of aetiological
factors. This seems to support HPC theory, but is also consistent
with the sort of intrinsic essentialism where the essence of the
disease is its pathophysiology. For instance, it could be claimed that
the essence of myocardial infarction is necrosis of the myocardium
from prolonged ischaemia, but different cases could differ with
respect to what had caused this ischaemic necrosis.
3.4. Merits of the causal theory
To summarise this section, I presented the causal theory of
reference as an account of how the reference of a diagnostic term is
determined. According to this theory, it is not determined by a
description, but by the actual nature of the disease and the causal
relations between speakers who use the term. For Putnam, it is not
the symptoms of a disease, but its cause that is essential for the
individuation of meaning. The resulting essentialism implies a dis-
ease model consisting of three parts: the cause of the disease; the
disease itself; andthesymptoms.However, I argued that thismodel is
too simplistic and suggested two modiﬁcations that allow a more
charitable rendering of the causal theory. One modiﬁcation, after
Williams, is to allowHPCs aswell as simple essences as determinants
of reference. The other modiﬁcation, after Thagard, is the expansion
of the three-step chain into a more complex causal network.
The causal theory of reference supports a robustly causal
conception of diagnostic terms, according to which diagnostic
terms do not refer to sets of symptoms, but to the disease processes
that cause the symptoms. This is the case even before the precise
natures of these disease processes are fully known, as these can be
discovered a posteriori. As noted in subsection 3.1, this helps to
avoid the problem of incommensurability that affects the descrip-
tive theory. Because reference is not determined by a description,
the change in description that results from changing disease un-
derstanding do not amount to a change in reference: “syphilis” did
not go from referring to a set of characteristic symptoms to refer-
ring to T. pallidum infection, but has referred to the same disease
from the outset. The subsequent discovery of T. pallidum simply
increased our knowledge of the nature of this disease.
In addition, these causal considerations explain why certain col-
lections of symptoms are characterised by doctors and scientists into
distinct syndromes. As noted by Williams (2011b), such actions are
those of people who consider the associated symptoms to be con-
nected by a unifying causal structure. In such case as syphilis, it turns
out that the symptomcluster is actually the result of a singular kind of
pathology. In other cases, it turns out that there aremultiple different
pathologies, each of which can cause the observed cluster of symp-
toms. For example, “dropsy”hadbeenused formanycenturies to refer
to the alleged disease associated with ﬂuid retention. However, it
turned out that there are multiple different pathologies that could
underlie cases of dropsy, and so the termwas discarded and replaced
by more speciﬁc diagnostic terms, such as “nephrotic syndrome”,
“congestiveheart failure”, and “cirrhosisof the liver” (Peitzman,2007).
According to the account presented in this section, a psychiatric
diagnosis, such as “major depressive disorder”, does not refer to a
cluster of symptoms, but to the disease process that causes these
symptoms. This accounts for the way in which clinical texts use
diagnostic terms in psychiatry to refer to the causes of symptoms,
as noted in Section 1. Furthermore, it provides a possible solution to
problem of cross-cultural incommensurability presented by Rad-
den’s comparison of Chinese andWestern depression in subsection
2.3. If “depression” is taken to refer to the putative disease process
that produces various symptoms, then Chinese and Westerndepression can be considered to be the same disorder based on the
assumption that they both involve this same disease process,
despite their having different symptom proﬁles.
However, in spite of these attractions, I argue that a pure causal
theory has signiﬁcant shortcomings regarding psychiatric diagnoses.
In particular, I argue that by supporting robustly causal conceptions
ofpsychiatricdisorders, itdownplays the important functionsof their
symptom-based diagnostic criteria in such manuals as DSM-5. Sec-
tion 4 examines this in more detail and proposes a two-dimensional
semantic framework that preserves the core features of the causal
theory while taking the descriptive diagnostic criteria seriously.
4. Two-dimensional semantics
4.1. Diagnostic criteria in psychiatry
As noted in Section 3, a key premise of Putnam and Kripke’s
causal theory of reference is that the reference of a term is not
determined by a description of superﬁcial properties. Accordingly,
Putnam argues that descriptions of symptoms are not necessary to
the meanings of diagnostic terms. Rather, they constitute stereo-
types, which provide conventional ideas of what the disorders look
like but are not analytically tied to their associated terms. This does
seem to be plausible for some of the medical diagnoses mentioned
throughout this paper, where the symptoms appear to be contin-
gent properties of the diseases. A painless case of inﬂammation of
the appendix is still a case of appendicitis. However, diagnostic
terms in psychiatry, such as “panic disorder” and “delusional dis-
order”, do seem to allude to their symptoms in ways that suggest
more fundamental connections between the symptoms and the
disorders. It seems oxymoronic to claim that a person could have
panic disorder without having recurrent panic attacks, or that a
person could have delusional disorder without having delusions.
In response, the causal theorist could appeal to the difference
between connotation and denotation. Kripke (1980, p.26) uses the
example of the town, Dartmouth. The name may have the conno-
tation of a location at the mouth of the River Dart, but this is not its
denotation. According to Kripke, the town could still retain the
name “Dartmouth”, even if the River Dart changes its course, and so
the connection between Dartmouth and its location at themouth of
the River Dart is contingent. Similarly, one might claim that “panic
disorder” has the connotation of certain symptoms, but denotes the
underlying disease that usually causes these symptoms.
However, this analogy is not wholly accurate. What it does not
acknowledge is that the symptom-based deﬁnitions in DSM-5 are
not just descriptions of disorders, but necessary criteria for applying
the diagnostic terms. While Dartmouth may still retain its name if
the River Dart changes course, the DSM-5 criteria for panic disorder
preclude a diagnosis of panic disorder unless recurrent panic attacks
are present. They set the conditions that something must satisfy for
it to qualify as an instance of the diagnosis. Hence, an analysis of the
reference of such a diagnostic term as “panic disorder” would need
to account for the fact that the presence of the relevant symptom
cluster is necessary for the correct applicationof thediagnostic term.
Again, this is unlike the case of a medical diagnosis such as acute
appendicitis, where the presence of the stereotypical symptoms is
not necessary for the diagnosis to be applied.
It appears that apure causal theory isnot adequate for theanalysis
of diagnostic terms in psychiatry, because it relegates the symptom-
baseddiagnostic criteria tomere contingent featuresof thedisorders.
This contradicts the important functions of these symptomcriteria as
necessary conditions for applications of the diagnostic terms. How-
ever, for reasons highlighted in Section 2, a return to pure descrip-
tivism would be undesirable. In what is to follow, I show how the
framework of two-dimensional semantics can help.
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Before I consider its application to diagnostic terms speciﬁcally, I
want to lay out the general motivations for two-dimensional se-
mantics in more detail. As previously noted, the causal theory of
reference states that the reference of a term such as “water”3 is not
determined by a description of water’s superﬁcial properties, but by
what turns out to be its essence, namely the microstructure H2O.
According to the causal theory, then, “water” has a single intension,
which rigidly designates H2O. This is taken to apply across all
possible worlds, such that “water ¼ H2O” is necessarily true.
However, as noted by Chalmers (1996), there remains an intuition
that “water” and “H2O” differ in some aspect of meaning. The two
are not epistemically equivalent. For instance, one could know that
the potable liquid found in rivers is water, and not know that it is
H2O. Furthermore, although the potable liquid found in rivers
which speakers had dubbed “water” actually did turn out to be H2O
in our world, we can still entertain a hypothetical scenario inwhich
this liquid we call “water” was discovered to be something else.
These intuitions suggest that there is more to the meaning of “wa-
ter” than having the microstructure H2O. In the literature (Chalmers,
1996; Jackson, 1998), this is normally explicated in modal terms with
a retelling of Putnam’s (1973) Twin Earth thought experiment. Twin
Earth is indistinguishable fromEarth inalmosteveryway. LikeEarth, its
rivers contain a colourless, tasteless, and potable liquid, which its in-
habitants call “water”. The difference between the two worlds is that
the stuff we call “water” on Earth was discovered to have the micro-
structure H2O, whereas the corresponding stuff on Twin Earth that is
called “water” by its inhabitants was discovered to have the micro-
structure XYZ. According to the causal theory of Kripke and Putnam,
this Twin Earth liquid is not water. Because “water” designates rigidly
and has been shown by chemistry to pick out H2O on Earth,
“water¼ H2O” is a necessary truth that holds across all worlds. Hence,
Twin Earthlings are wrong to claim that “water ¼ XYZ”. However, if a
causal theorist fromTwinEarthwere to apply the samestandards, then
he or she would arrive at the opposite conclusion and claim that we
Earthlings are wrong to call our liquid “water”, because the liquid that
Twin Earthlings had dubbed “water” was shown by chemistry to be
XYZ.This suggests that if theworldhadturnedout tobe likeTwinEarth,
then “water” would refer to XYZ instead of H2O.
The above brings out the tension between the causal theorist’s
claim that “water” necessarily refers to H2O and the intuition that it
could have referred to something else had the world turned out to
be different in the relevant way. Two-dimensional semantics re-
solves this tension. This is a formal framework developed by
Stalnaker (1978), and later championed by Jackson (1998) and
Chalmers (1996, 2010).4 It proposes that the meaning of “water” is3 I am grateful to anonymous referee who raised a concern about the suitability
of the “water” example, considering that the framework presented here is proposed
as a solution to a problem regarding diagnostic terms. In response, my aim in this
subsection is to explicate the framework by presenting a familiar paradigm case
where it has been applied and from which parallels can be drawn to the cases of
diagnostic terms. Not only is “water” the example which has received perhaps the
most detailed analysis by proponents of two-dimensional semantics (Chalmers,
1996; Jackson, 1998), but it is an example that has been used to demonstrate a
problem with the causal theory of reference similar to the problem I suggest is
presented by certain diagnostic terms. As I note in subsection 4.1, it is counterin-
tuitive to think of a case of panic disorder without panic attacks. Similarly, it has
been argued that notwithstanding the causal theory of reference, the superﬁcial
properties of water are still somehow relevant to the meaning of “water” (Barnett,
2000).
4 Different proponents of two-dimensional semantics apply it to different
problems. Stalnaker (1978) uses it to examine what is communicated by speakers
when there is doubt about the meanings of certain utterances. Jackson (1998) uses
it to reconcile semantic externalismwith an a priori approach to meaning. Chalmers
(1996, 2010) famously uses it to endorse dualism in the philosophy of mind.not only dependent on a posteriori facts about theworld, but also on
which possible world we assumed to be the actual world in which
the reference is ﬁxed. In the framework of Kripke and Putnam, only
Earth is taken to be actual, while all other possible worlds are taken
to be counterfactual. Hence, in this scenario, “water” only picks out
the substance that was discovered to be H2O. However, if one as-
sumes Twin Earth to be the actual world that one inhabits, then
“water” would pick out the substance that was discovered to be
XYZ.
Two-dimensional semantics, then, proposes that a given term,
such as “water”, is taken to express two intensions.5 The primary
intension (1-intension) of a term is what the termwould pick out in
a chosen world if that world is imagined to be the actual world in
which the reference is ﬁxed. Given that the reference ﬁxing occurs
before the discovery of the underlying essential nature of the
phenomenon in question, the 1-intension roughly approximates to
the phenomenon’s pre-theoretical mode of presentation.6 For
instance, the 1-intension of “water” (1-WATER) roughly corre-
sponds to the colourless, tasteless, and potable liquid found in
rivers. As mentioned above, this liquid that was dubbed “water”
turns out to be H2O in the scenario where Earth is imagined to be
the actual world in which the reference is ﬁxed, but turns out to be
XYZ in the scenario where Twin Earth is imagined to be actual.
The secondary intension (2-intension) of a term is what the
term picks out if we ﬁx our world as actual and then evaluate other
worlds as counterfactual relative to it. The 2-intension of “water”
(2-WATER) only picks out H2O, because water was discovered to be
H2O in our world. This identity is taken to be necessary, such that
“water” refers to H2O across all counterfactual worlds. Note that the
2-intension corresponds to the Kripkean intension as per the causal
theory of reference. The reference of 2-WATER is not determined by
a cluster of descriptions, but by the microstructure H2O. Therefore,
two-dimensional semantics assimilates the causal theory of refer-
ence. Along with it, I argue that it can assimilate the modiﬁcations
to the causal theory presented in subsection 3.3, such that HPCs as
well as simple essences may be the determinants of 2-intensions.
The above modal story accounts for the way in which there can
be two dimensions of a term’s meaning, one which is dependent on
the pre-theoretical mode of presentation of the phenomenon
associated with the term, and another which is dependent onwhat
the underlying nature of this phenomenon a posteriori turns to be.
It also has implications for the notions of necessity and contin-
gency. These implications are useful for understanding the con-
ceptual relations between a term and its associated concepts. For
example, the sorts of relation that “water” has with “H2O” and with
“potable liquid found in rivers” depend on whether we assume 1-
WATER or 2-WATER. If 1-WATER is assumed, then
“water ¼ potable liquid found in rivers” is necessarily true, because
it is deﬁned by this mode of presentation, while “water ¼ H2O” is
contingently true, because the potable liquid that was dubbed
“water” in another world could have turned out to be something
other than H2O. On the other hand, if 2-WATER is assumed, then
“water ¼ H2O” is necessarily true, because the liquid that was
dubbed “water” in our world a posteriori turned out to be H2O,5 Different authors use different names for these two intensions, but here I follow
the terminology of Chalmers (2010).
6 Chalmers (1996, pp.56e65) initially suggests that the 1-intension may be
determined by a Fregean description of its referent. However, he later concedes that
this is not the case for all 1-intensions, as it is doubtful whether some terms, such as
“knowledge”, can be adequately encapsulated in a description (Chalmers, 2002,
pp.143e149). Instead, he suggests that 1-intensions can be thought of as capturing
what the extensions of terms would be in different epistemic possibilities about
how the world turns out. While these may sometimes be captured by descriptions,
this need not always be the case.
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because H2O could have had a different form in a counterfactual
world.
This can be captured by the idea that there are two sorts of
necessity and two sorts of contingency, which respectively corre-
spond to the necessity and contingency when the 1-intension of a
term is assumed (1-necessity and 1-contingency), and to the ne-
cessity and contingency when the 2-intension of the term is
assumed (2-necessity and 2-contingency) (Chalmers, 2010, p.167).
Hence, “water ¼ potable liquid found in rivers”, is 1-necessary but
2-contingent, whereas “water ¼ H2O” is 2-necessary but 1-
contingent. 1-necessity can be thought of as corresponding to the
deﬁnitional relation between a term and a description, while 2-
necessity corresponds to the Kripkean a posteriori necessity as
per the causal theory of reference. As I shall show in the following
subsection, this offers a way of analysing the conceptual relations
between psychiatric diagnoses, DSM-5 symptom criteria, and the
pathologies purported to cause these symptoms.
And so, the two-dimensional semantic framework presented
here can be thought of as one way of synthesising the causal theory
with descriptivist considerations to capture different aspects of a
term’s complex semantic value that have useful epistemic roles
(Chalmers, 2010, p.563). In virtue of a term’s 2-intension, a causal
theorist can accept Chalmers’ account of how the reference of that
term is determined. However, while the causal theorist might
consider this to constitute the entire meaning of the term, for
Chalmers it only constitutes one aspect of its meaning. The term
also has a 1-intension that corresponds to its mode of presentation.
An implication of this is that the two-dimensional theorist can
reject the causal theorist’s claim that a deﬁnition based on super-
ﬁcial properties is not relevant to the reference of a term. A deﬁ-
nition is not merely a stereotype, but is a genuine aspect of a term’s
meaning. As we shall see, this makes two-dimensional semantics
better suited than a pure causal theory for the analysis of diagnostic
terms in psychiatry.
4.3. A two-dimensional semantic account of diagnostic terms
I propose that a two-dimensional semantic framework can
make sense of termswhose applications necessitate the presence of
certain superﬁcial properties despite the terms being used by
speakers to refer to the causes of these properties. This is particu-
larly relevant to psychiatry, where the meanings of diagnostic
terms are necessarily tied to descriptions of symptoms despite the
terms being invoked to refer to the causes of these symptoms.
Although this particular issue is not so obviously a problem for
many diagnoses in somatic medicine, the framework can none-
theless accommodate the analysis of medical diagnoses as well.
In subsection 4.2, I explicated the principles of the framework
with appeal to the classic example of “water”. I suggest that diag-
nostic terms are amenable to the same kind of analysis. Like “wa-
ter”, a diagnosis has a pre-theoretical mode of presentation that
characterises the 1-intension, and an underlying structure that is
discovered a posteriori and determines the 2-intension. In the case
of “water”, the mode of presentation is roughly the colourless,
tasteless, and potable liquid found in lakes and rivers, whereas the a
posteriori discovered underlying structure is H2O. In the case of a
diagnosis, the mode of presentation is the clinical manifestation
and the underlying structure is the disease process that is
responsible for the clinical manifestation. For example, the 1-
intension of the term “polio” is roughly the transmissible condi-
tion presenting with infantile paralysis, whereas the 2-intension is
poliovirus infection.
In psychiatry, the clinical manifestations for diagnoses are
codiﬁed in the DSM-5 deﬁnitions. A DSM-5 deﬁnition, then,captures the 1-intension of a diagnosis. For example, the 1-
intension of “panic disorder” includes “recurrent unexpected
panic attacks” (APA, 2013, p.209) and the 1-intension of “delusional
disorder” includes “the presence of one or more delusions that
persist for at least 1 month” (APA, 2013, p.92). As previously
mentioned, these deﬁnitions serve as necessary criteria for the
diagnoses, which squares neatly with Chalmers’ (2002, p.143)
suggestion that the role of a description is to provide conditions
that give speakers ways to identify the extension of the term. The 2-
intensions of diagnoses arewhatever turn out to be their respective
underlying pathological processes, as per the causal theory of
reference.
It is worth noting here that the 1-intensions may change across
time, as demonstrated by the changes in the criteria for schizo-
phrenia from DSM-IV to DSM-5 mentioned in Section 2.2. This is
compatible with Chalmers’ account, as he accepts that certain kinds
of conceptual change involve changes in an expression’s 1-
intension (Chalmers, 2012, p.210). However, the implication of se-
mantic incommensurability is avoided here by the supposition that
the 2-intension is invariant. Hence, although DSM-IV schizophrenia
and DSM-5 schizophrenia have different 1-intensions, they are
assumed to have the same 2-intension in virtue of their referring to
the same causative pathology. This highlights the point made in
Section 2.2 that diagnostic terms also go through sorts of concep-
tual change other than the changes from descriptive to causal
conceptions suggested by Hempel and Thagard. In particular, they
can undergo changes in the descriptive deﬁnitions, which amount
to changes in their 1-intensions.
Furthermore, Chalmers also suggests that it is possible at a given
time for concepts to have different 1-intensions but the same 2-
intension. For example, “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” have
different 1-intensions, as the former picks out the evening star and
the latter picks out the morning star, but they have the same 2-
intension, as both refer to the planet Venus (Chalmers, 1996,
p.65). I suggest that this can be applied to Radden’s cross-cultural
example of Chinese and Western depression. The differences in
the symptom proﬁles of Chinese and Western depression can be
taken to constitute different 1-intensions, but the two can still be
equated on the basis of the assumption that they have the same 2-
intension, hence avoiding the implication of cross-cultural se-
mantic incommensurability.
Analysing diagnostic terms in psychiatry as having 1-intensions
and 2-intensions allows us to take their descriptive deﬁnitions in
DSM-5 seriously as necessary criteria making the diagnoses, yet
still talk about the diagnoses as referring to the causes of the
symptoms that make up these deﬁnitions. Let us consider, for
example, the connection between “panic disorder” and the DSM-5
description “recurrent unexpected panic attacks”. If the 1-intension
of “panic disorder” is assumed, then the connection is necessary,
because the 1-intension is deﬁned through this DSM-5 description.
This 1-necessity reﬂects the way in which the DSM-5 symptom
criteria are explicitly required for the diagnosis to be made. A
diagnosis of panic disorder, for instance, cannot be made unless
recurrent unexpected panic attacks are present. Therefore, unlike a
pure causal theory of reference, two-dimensional semantics does
not relegate the DSM-5 symptom criteria to contingent features of
the disorder, but acknowledges they are necessarily tied to the
diagnosis in virtue of the diagnostic term’s 1-intension.
If the 2-intension of “panic disorder” is assumed, then the term
refers to whatever turns out to be the pathology that normally
causes recurrent unexpected panic attacks. The connection be-
tween the 2-intension of “panic disorder” and “recurrent unex-
pected panic attacks” is contingent, because it is counterfactually
conceivable that the pathology picked out by the 2-intension could
be present without it being accompanied by recurrent unexpected
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pendix to be present without it being accompanied by abdominal
pain. This reﬂects the way in which the diagnostic term is used in
medical textbooks and health information resources to refer to
what is causing a set of symptoms, such as panic disorder being
invoked as the cause of a patient’s panic attacks.
A two-dimensional semantic analysis, then, provides a resolu-
tion to the tension between the DSM-5 deﬁnitions of psychiatric
diagnoses as symptom clusters and their uses in other clinical texts
as terms that refer to the causes of these symptom clusters. Under
this framework, a diagnostic term does not have a single intension,
but a complex semantic value involving a 1-intension and a 2-
intension. These two intensions have different epistemic roles
that capture the two kinds of talk mentioned above. In virtue of
their 1-intensions, diagnostic term are deﬁned through their
symptoms, which captures their symptom-based deﬁnitions in
DSM-5. In virtue of their 2-intensions, they refer to the pathologies
that normally cause these symptoms, which captures their uses as
explanations of patients’ symptoms in textbooks and health infor-
mation resources. This suggests, pace Szasz, that although a psy-
chiatric diagnosis is deﬁned through its symptoms, this does not
necessarily preclude it from serving as a causal explanation of these
symptoms.
4.4. Other implications
As well as resolving the tension between the two kinds of talk
regarding psychiatric diagnoses, two-dimensional semantics has
further strengths as a framework for the analysis of diagnostic
terms more generally. First, its semantic pluralism helps to char-
acterise the different kinds of information conveyed by diagnostic
terms in the communicative exchanges of clinicians. A diagnosis
normally provides both information about a patient’s likely clinical
presentation and information about the underlying disease pro-
cess, which respectively correspond to the 1-intension and 2-
intension of the diagnostic term. For example, “chronic bron-
chitis” not only informs the clinician that the patient is likely to be
presenting with cough and sputum expectoration, but also that the
underlying disease process is inﬂammation of the airways.
Second, two-dimensional semantics not only provides a way of
interpreting changes in disease understanding that does not imply
radical incommensurability, but also has the added advantage of
taking seriously the different epistemic possibilities entertained by
scientists in the early stages of disease understanding. Before the
nature of the underlying pathology is understood, speakers rely on
the 1-intension of the disease term. For example, before poliovirus
was discovered by Landsteiner and Popper in 1909, doctors applied
the term “polio” to cases of infantile paralysis, while aiming to
elucidate the underlying causal structure. This 1-intension analysis
allows for the intuition that the condition presenting with infantile
paralysis that was dubbed “polio” could have turned out to be
caused by something else had the world been different in the
relevant way. In actuality, polio turned out to be caused by polio-
virus, which indicates that “polio ¼ poliovirus infection” is 2-
necessary. However, before poliovirus was discovered, Land-
steiner and Popper had initially tried to look for a responsible
bacterial agent (Skern, 2010, p.1372). This suggests that they had
entertained the epistemic possibility that polio is not caused by
poliovirus infection, which can be captured with the analysis that
“polio ¼ poliovirus infection” is 1-contingent.
Once the nature of polio’s underlying pathology was discovered
to be poliovirus infection, speakers could then utilise the 2-
intension, which is determined by rigidifying this evaluation so
that “polio” refers only to poliovirus infection across all worlds.
Because the 2-intension ﬁxes the reference of “polio” across allworlds, it establishes which cases of infantile paralysis are cases of
polio and which ones are not. Hence, cases of infantile paralysis in
the past that were not caused by poliovirus infection were not
actually cases of polio. It is this 2-intension that is central to the
aims of further scientiﬁc research into prevention and treatment.
When Salk and Sabinwere developing vaccines for polio, they were
developing vaccines speciﬁcally to prevent poliovirus infection.
The above suggests that the move from descriptive to causal
conceptions of a diagnostic term involves the change in emphasis
from the term’s 1-intension to its 2-intension. This does not involve
the semantic incommensurability permitted by the descriptive
theory of reference, because the determination of a diagnostic
term’s reference follows the same processes of reference ﬁxing and
borrowing as proposed by the causal theory of reference. The 2-
intension of the term rigidly designates what the causal structure
of a disease turns out to be, which maintains reference stability.
Hence, “polio” denotes only genuine cases of poliovirus infection.
Nonetheless, the 1-intension accounts for the epistemic possibility
of scenarios where the condition that was dubbed “polio” had
turned out to be caused by something other than poliovirus.
5. Summary and further considerations
This paper has explored how philosophical theories of reference
apply to diagnostic terms, with the aim of resolving the tension
between the descriptive deﬁnitions of psychiatric diagnoses in
DSM-5 and their causal conceptions in other clinical resources. I
argued that there are good reasons to reject a traditional descrip-
tive theory of reference regarding diagnostic terms, including the
implication of semantic incommensurability between old and new
uses of a term. Although the causal theory of reference fares better
at maintaining reference stability and complements causal con-
ceptions of diagnostic terms, I argued that a pure causal theory does
not account for diagnoses whose criteria specify the fulﬁlment of
particular symptom descriptions. I sketched how a two-
dimensional semantic framework that assimilates the causal the-
ory with descriptive considerations resolves this problem and ac-
commodates the two seemingly contradictory ways in which
diagnostic terms are used in psychiatry.
The framework I have presented suggests that invoking psy-
chiatric diagnoses as causal explanations of patients’ symptoms is
not necessarily precluded by the fact that they are deﬁned through
these symptoms. This partly addresses the Szaszian worry that a
mental illness cannot explain behaviour because it is just a short-
hand label for this behaviour. However, some concessions need to
be made, which I consider in this ﬁnal section.
First, for some disorders, there are doubts about whether the
underlying causal structures will turn out to be sufﬁciently stable
and repeatable for their respective diagnostic categories to be
considered epistemically useful. In other words, it may turn out to
be the case that the symptoms of the disorder can be produced in
many different ways and that there is no unifying set of mecha-
nisms that is shared by every instance of the disorder. Research into
the pathophysiology of major depressive disorder (MDD) has not
revealed any single underlying cause, but many diverse factors at
multiple levels, none of which are universally present across all
cases (Hasler, 2010). The worry, then, is that “MDD” could turn out
to be like the case of “dropsy” mentioned in subsection 3.4, such
that its 2-intension refers to a disjunct of cause1 or cause2 or cause3
or . or causen of such and such symptoms, or any combination
thereof. Perhaps “MDD” could be discarded in favour of more
precise terms, each of which refers to each of the causal structures
that usually produce the typical symptoms. However, it may be the
case that the vast number of different interacting causal factors
implicated would make such a neat subdivision problematic.
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social processes that also inﬂuence the semantic practices sur-
rounding psychiatric diagnoses. One such account of these pro-
cesses in the philosophical literature is Hacking’s (1999) theory of
dynamic nominalism. Using the example of childhood autism,
Hacking (1999, pp.114e115) proposes that psychiatric disorders are
interactive kinds: categorising disorders results in looping effects
that alter the natures of the disorders in question. He argues that
since the category of childhood autismwas coined, the ideas about
the disorder that became prevalent in society have inﬂuenced the
sorts of behaviour with which new cases present. This suggests that
there is an aspect of “childhood autism” that changes in response to
social processes.
I propose that this complements rather than challenges the two-
dimensional semantic framework I have presented. In fact, Hacking
(1999, pp.119e124) himself is sympathetic towards the use of
Putnam and Kripke’s causal theory as a tool to analyse the se-
mantics of diagnostic terms, such as “childhood autism” being used
to designate the putative pathology P. This suggests that childhood
autism is an interactive kind with respect to its prototypical
symptoms, but is presumed to be a natural kind with respect to P. I
argue that this is consistent with the analysis that the changes that
result from looping effects are with respect to the 1-intension of
“childhood autism”, whereas the 2-intension is posited as
remaining stable in virtue of P. Of course, it may turn out that P is a
range of pathologies rather than a single deﬁnite pathology, but this
too can be accommodated with the analysis that the 2-intension of
“childhood autism” is disjunctive. Nevertheless, Hacking’s impor-
tant observations highlight that there are dynamics working at the
level of classiﬁcation that are not speciﬁcally expounded by the
theories of reference discussed in this paper. And so, while the two-
dimensional semantic framework presented in this paper accounts
for the semantic practices of psychiatrists working within a bio-
logical programme of research, a more complete analysis of the
meanings of psychiatric diagnoses would also need to consider the
historical and social processes involved in meaning-making.Acknowledgements
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